

Biological Warfare Agents

The reader is strongly advised to supplement material in this chapter with the following reference:

US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). *Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook*. 8th ed. Fort Detrick, MD: USAMRIID; 2005.

Introduction

Biological warfare (BW) agents infect the body via the same portals of entry as infectious organisms that occur naturally. These include inhalation into the respiratory tract; ingestion into the gastrointestinal tract; and absorption through mucous membranes, eyes, skin, or wounds. Most BW agents will enter the body through inhalation. Usually, the disease produced by a BW agent will mimic the naturally occurring disease, but the clinical presentation can be different if delivery of an agent occurs through a portal that differs from the natural portal.

Detection

- The appearance of a large outbreak of cases of a similar disease or syndrome, especially in a discrete population.
- Many cases of unexplained diseases or death.
- More severe disease than is usually expected for a specific pathogen or failure to respond to a standard therapy.
- Unusual routes of exposure for a pathogen, such as the inhalation route of diseases that normally occur through other exposures.
- A disease case or cases that are unusual for a given geographic area or transmission season.
- Disease normally transmitted by a vector that is not present in the local area.

- Multiple simultaneous or serial epidemics of different diseases in the same population.
- A single case of disease caused by an uncommon agent (smallpox, some viral hemorrhagic fevers, inhalational anthrax, pneumonic plague).
- A disease that is unusual for an age group.
- Unusual strains of variants of organisms or antimicrobial resistance patterns different from those known to be circulating.
- A similar or identical genetic type among agents isolated from distinct sources at different times or locations.
- Higher attack rates among those exposed in certain areas, such as inside a building if released indoors, or lower rates in those inside a sealed building if released outside.
- Outbreaks of the same disease occurring simultaneously in noncontiguous areas.
- Zoonotic disease outbreaks.
- A zoonotic disease occurring in humans, but not animals.
- Intelligence of a potential attack, claims by a terrorist or aggressor of a release, and discovery of munitions, tampering, or other potential vehicle of spread (spray device, contaminated letter).

Diagnosis

The first indication of an attack may be when large numbers of patients present with the same constellation of signs and symptoms, especially for a disease that is not endemic to the area of operations.

Rapid diagnostic tests may be available in forward areas to assist clinicians in early diagnosis:

- Isolation of the etiological agent can occur within 1–2 days for some agents.
- Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs).
- Genome detection by polymerase chain reaction.
- Antibody detection.

Prevention and Protection

- Immunizations: Anthrax and, in specific scenarios, smallpox and plague.
 - Pre- or postexposure chemoprophylaxis—anthrax, plague, Q fever, and tularemia. Chemoprophylaxis for anthrax is presently approved by the Food and Drug Administration for postexposure only.
 - ◆ Investigational new drugs exist for the treatment of Argentine hemorrhagic fever, botulinum toxin, Q fever, Rift Valley fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and tularemia.
- Protective clothing and mask.

Decontamination—Personnel, Equipment, and Clothing

- **Mechanical** decontamination removes, but not necessarily neutralizes, the BW agent.
 - Brushing to ensure loosening of the BW agent from the surface.
 - Filtration and chlorination of drinking water to remove organisms.
- **Chemical** decontamination renders BW agents harmless through the use of disinfectants.
 - Soap and water followed with copious rinsing with water is often sufficient.
 - For patients requiring urgent decontamination, biological agents are neutralized within 5 minutes when contaminated areas are washed with a 0.5 % hypochlorite solution (1 part household bleach mixed with 9 parts water).
 - **Do not use hypochlorite in the eyes, in the abdominal cavity, or on nerve tissue.**
 - A 5% hypochlorite solution (ie, household bleach) may be used to decontaminate clothing or equipment.
- **Physical** decontamination, such as heat and solar ultraviolet radiation.
 - Dry heat for 2 hours at 160°C.
 - Autoclaving at 120°C under 1 atm of overpressure for 20 minutes.
 - Ultraviolet radiation is difficult to standardize.

- Dry biological agents can be a hazard through secondary aerosolization, but adequate liquid decontamination will prevent this hazard. There is no vapor hazard, and special protective masks are generally not required for surgical personnel.

Infection Control

Infection control procedures should be reinforced for situations involving BW agents. Standard precautions are appropriate for BW agents once they have been identified. For an undifferentiated febrile illness following a BW agent attack:

- Place patients together in an isolated setting, such as a designated tent or other structure.
- Surgical masks may be placed on patients when isolation is not possible.
- Employ respiratory droplet precautions along with standard precautions until diseases transmissible by droplet (eg, plague and smallpox) have been excluded.

Medical Evacuation

- If plague, smallpox, and hemorrhagic fevers can be **excluded**, patients may be evacuated using standard precautions and the disease-specific precautions.

Plague and smallpox are internationally quarantinable diseases. Do not evacuate patient across international borders unless authorized by the theater surgeon.

- Isolation precautions should be added to standard precautions.
- Immediately upon diagnosing patients with smallpox, the line and medical chain of command must be notified.
- Observe strict quarantine.
 - Standard and respiratory droplet isolation precautions.
 - ◆ **Standard precautions.**
 - ◇ Hand washing after patient contact.
 - ◇ Use of gloves when touching blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions, and contaminated items.
 - ◇ Use of mask, eye protection, and gown during procedures likely to generate sprays of blood, body fluids, secretions, or excretions.

- ◇ Handle contaminated patient-care equipment and linen in a manner that precludes transfer of microorganisms to individuals or equipment.
- ◇ Practice care when handling sharps and use pocket mask or other ventilation device when ventilating the patient.
- ◇ Place patient in private room when possible. Limit the movement or transfer of the patient.
- ◆ **Droplet precautions.**
 - ◇ Standard precautions plus:
 - Place patient in private room or with someone with the same infection. If not feasible, maintain at least 1 m distance between patients.
 - Use a mask when working within 1 m of patient.
 - Mask the patient if he or she needs to be moved.
 - All contacts should be vaccinated within 7 days of exposure and quarantined together for at least 17 days following the most recent exposure.

Hemorrhagic Fevers—Hanta, Ebola, Lassa, Rift Valley, and Hemorrhagic Fever With Renal Syndrome

- These viruses pose special challenges for hospital infection control. With the exception of dengue and hantaviruses, viral hemorrhagic fever patients harbor significant levels of potentially infectious virus in blood, body fluids, or secretions. Special caution must be exercised in handling hypodermic needles and other sharps. Strict adherence to standard and contact precautions will prevent nosocomial transmission in most cases.
- When a viral hemorrhagic fever is suspected, additional infection control measures are indicated. The patient should be isolated in a private room with an adjoining anteroom to be used for donning and doffing protective barrier garments, storage of supplies, and decontamination of lab specimen containers.
- Medical evacuation may result in increased morbidity and mortality; thus, treatment at local medical treatment facilities is preferred.
- When necessary, patients may be evacuated using universal and respiratory droplet isolation precautions.

Biological Agents

The four toxins most likely to be used as biological agents are botulinum toxins, ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, and T-2 mycotoxins (Table 29-1).

Table 29-1. Symptoms and Medical Management of Biological Toxins

Biological Toxin	Signs/Symptoms	Medical Management
Botulinum	Cranial nerve palsies Paralysis Respiratory failure	Antitoxin/supportive care
Ricin	Fever, cough, shortness of breath Arthralgias, pulmonary edema	Nonspecific/supportive care
SEB	Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea Fever, chills, headache	Nonspecific/supportive care
T-2 mycotoxin	Skin pain, redness, blistering Nasal itching, epistaxis, rhinorrhea Dyspnea, wheezing, cough	Nonspecific/supportive care

SEB: staphylococcal enterotoxin B.

Bacterial Agents

The bacteria or rickettsia most often considered to be potential BW threat agents include *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax), *Brucella* sp. (brucellosis), *Vibrio cholerae* (cholera), *Burkholderia mallei* (glanders), *Yersinia pestis* (plague), *Francisella tularensis* (tularemia), and *Coxiella burnetii* (Q fever) (Table 29-2).

Table 29-2. Symptoms and Medical Management of Bacterial Agents

Bacterial Agent	Signs/Symptoms	Medical Management
Anthrax	Fever, malaise, cough, shortness of breath, cyanosis	Ciprofloxacin
Plague	High fever, chills, headache, cough, shortness of breath, cyanosis	Streptomycin
Brucellosis	Fever, headache, myalgias, sweats, chills	Doxycycline
Cholera	Massive watery diarrhea	Fluid therapy and antibiotics (tetracycline, doxycycline, or ciprofloxacin)
Tularemia	Local ulcer, lymphadenopathy, fever, chills, headache, and malaise	Streptomycin
Q fever	Fever, cough, and pleuritic chest pain	Tetracycline

Viral Agents

A number of viruses are BW agents, including smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and the alpha virus that causes Venezuelan equine encephalitis (Table 29-3).

Table 29-3. Symptoms and Medical Management of Viral Agents

Viral Agent	Signs/Symptoms	Medical Management
VEE	Fever and encephalitis	Nonspecific/supportive care
Smallpox	Malaise, fever, rigors, vomiting, headache followed by pustular vesicles	Antiviral under investigation/supportive care
VHF	Flushing of the face, petechiae, bleeding, fever, myalgias, vomiting, and diarrhea	Nonspecific/supportive care

VEE: Venezuelan equine encephalitis; VHF: viral hemorrhagic fever.

**For Clinical Practice Guidelines, go to
http://jts.amedd.army.mil/index.cfm/PI_CPGs/cpgs**